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Abstract: Like in any other Muslim countries, an analysis 
of Islamic space in Indonesia cannot ignore the jihadist 
movements that took shape there. Since the reformation 
era, Indonesians have witnessed a number of bloody 
tragedies, ranging from religious conflicts in Ambon, 
attacks to the Western embassies offices, to the deadliest 
suicide bombings in Bali. All aforementioned attacks entails 
that a terrorist group operating in Southeast Asia called 
Jama’ah Islamiyyah does exist. The article deals with the 
historical account of the transformation of Indonesian 
jihadist movements. It will discuss, first, the intellectual 
roots of the emergence of transnational jihadist movements 
and, second, the Indonesian’ links to the trend as Jamaah 
Islamiyyah has demonstrated. The “near enemy” (al-‘aduww 
al-qarīb) and the “far enemy” (al-‘aduww al-ba‘īd) developed 
by Greges are key notions quoted as analytical tools to deal 
with diverse acts of jihadist movement in responde to the 
local and global parties perceived as anti-Islam. 
Keywords: Jihadist movement, Jama’ah Islamiyyah, 
transnational jihadist networks. 
Introduction 
Since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998) and along 
with the political democratisation of the country, Indonesians have 
witnessed a number of bloody attacks, suicide bombings, and 
terrorism. It leads to the condemnation and accusation, including from 
that of the former prime minister of Singapore who maintained that 
Indonesia is “a nest for terrorists”. The Prime Minister also accused 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as the leader of the most dangerous terrorist 
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organisation operating in Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyyah.1 
However, the attacks and suicide bombings are not peculiar to 
Indonesia since a number of other Muslim countries and western 
states were also experiencing similar threat of terrorism. 
The article deals with two main issues. First, is the issue of the 
intellectual roots of jihadist movements. To discuss this point, the 
paper will argue that current Indonesian jihadist movements 
demonstrated the continuation and change of jihadist ideology 
transferred from the Middle East. It is the Afghan War and the New 
Order politics which had paved the way to the rise of transnational 
jihadist networks in Indonesia. During of the Afghan War, hundreds 
of Indonesians, mainly those who were in favour of jihad against the 
denounced heretic rulers of the New Order, made their hijrah (fleeing) 
to neighbouring country, Malaysia, as the station for the next jihad to 
set Afghanistan free from the Atheist Russian Armies. In addition, the 
journey was also aimed at strengthening the previous rebellion 
movement, Darul Islam, militias and to wage jihad in Indonesia as they 
went home.  
Second, is the issue of the backdrop of Indonesian jihadist 
movements and the emergence of Indonesian transnational jihadist like 
Jamaah Islamiyyah. The emergence of this allegedly terrorist 
organisation implies the existence of the global trend of jihadist 
movements. The late twentieth century, however, has witnessed the 
shifting paradigm of Indonesian jihadist movements, from al-‘aduww al-
qarīb (near enemies) to al-‘aduww al-ba‘īd (far enemies). This shift in 
paradigm is something that similar movements in the Middle East have 
experienced. 
Jihadist Movements: an Overview 
In the recent debates over Islam, the idea of jihad has been 
invoked quite regularly. Keppel assumes that jihad is the central topic 
of contemporary Islamist ideology.2 Ahmed Rashid in the meantime 
                                                 
1 “Mozaik Teror Antar-Bangsa” (the Inter-State Terror Mosaic), Tempo Magazine, Issue 
30/XXXI/23-29 September 2002 and “Lee Menuding, Jakarta Meradang” (Lee 
Accusing, Jakarta Inflamed), Tempo Magazine, Issue 52/XXX/25 February-03 March 
2002. 
2 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, trans. by Anthony F. Roberts 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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argues that it refers to radical Islamist groups,3 attachment to local 
values and resistance against homogenising trends of globalisation4. A 
radical anti-Islam scholar says that it represents as a proof of innate 
violence and incompatibility of Islam and civilised norms.5 Monte 
Palmer and Princess Palmer however draw their attention on the 
current aggressive jihadist movements which they identified as 
revolutionary groups launching jihad or Holy War against the United 
States, Israel, Europe and anyone else who opposes their vision of a 
world governed by shari >‘ah.6 Supported by multitude schools, 
charitable associations, banks, business activities and Islamic world’s 
governments, these revolutionary movements attempt to elevate the 
status of jihad in Muslim consciousness and make it equal with the five 
pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving and 
pilgrimage). In contrast to consensus (ijmā‘) of majority of the ‘ulamā, 
they consider jihad as a permanent and personal obligation (fard} ‘ayn) 
and a vital pillar of Islam.7 
These jihadist movements draw their primary inspiration from the 
twelfth century scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who persuasively 
argued that Islam requires state power and proclaimed that Mongol-
Muslims who had conquered the core of Islamic world as infidels and 
unbelievers which had to be fought against.8 It was in the beginning of 
the eighteenth century when the Ottoman Empire had entered military 
and economic crises, a politically ambitious ‘ulamā of Arab, 
Muh}ammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahha >b (d. 1792), reinstalled Ibn Taymi>ya’s 
spirits for the sake of his ethnic supremacy. He began with making a 
                                                 
3 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
4 Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995). 
5 Daniel Pipes, “What Is Jihad?,” New York Post, December 31, 2002. 
6 Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadist, and America’s 
War on Terrorism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp. 1 -5. 
7 Fawaz A. Greges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 3. 
8 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 45-48; ICG, “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and 
Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix”, 13 September 2003; Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taimiyya on Public 
and Private Law in Islam, or Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence, transl. from Arabic by 
Omar A. Farrukh (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 145. 
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faithful alliance with Muh}ammad ibn Su`u >d and called Muslims to 
learn and think for themselves (’ijtihād), and reject the blind imitation 
(taqli >d) by resorting to Qur’a>n and Sunnah. He prescribed jihad against 
all wicked heretics (bid‘a) and called for solution through the purity of 
tauhīd.9 In politics, Wahhab considered the Turk as a threat to Arab 
supremacy and called for jihad against the ‘ajam (non-Arab) 
domination.10  
The next influential Muslim thinker of jihadist movement is 
H{assa>n al-Banna> (1906-1949). Unlike Ibn Taymi >yah and ‘Abd al-
Wahha >b, al-Banna>’s contribution to jihadist vision is his recognition of 
Europe (and the West in general) as an intellectual as well as physical 
threat.11 He called Muslim to fight against Westernisation and the 
“mental colonisation” of Muslim through Islamic education. The first 
battlefield, according to him, would be against unbeliever who had 
occupied Islamic territory and afterward jihad would reach out to 
include the rest of the world. In 1928, al-Banna > founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood (al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimi >n) to carry out his plan.12 Held 
responsible for the assassination of the prime minister of Egypt in 
December 1948, he was killed by the Egyptian Police. However, his 
legacy, the al-Ikhwa >n al-Muslimi >n, still existed as the armed group 
which has been involved in numerous violent attacks in the Middle 
East. 
Perhaps the greatest influential thinker and activist of the al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimin is an Egyptian militant, Sayyid Qut}b (1906-1966). 
Qut}b began his life as a literary critic, open to ideas and influences 
from the West.  But after his travel to the United States from 1948 to 
                                                 
9 Jhon O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1994), pp. 53-56. 
10 Yudian Wahyudi, Slogan “Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan Sunnah” Sebagai Solusi Ideal 
Kemunduran Islam di Era Modern (Yogyakarta: Nawesea Press, 2007) 
11 Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi’, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in The Modern Word Arab 
World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 90 
12 Though the Muslim Brotherhood did not engage in Egyptian politics and focused 
on the da’wa (missionary) activities through the establishment of Islamic social services, 
like medical clinics and religious schools, it also said that the Brotherhood run its 
secret armed factions which were ready to engage in jihad with British and, once the 
colonial powers left, with the secular Egyptian governments that replaced them. 
Richard P. Mitchel, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969) 
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1950, he became a strong critic of the West.13 Upon his return to 
Egypt in 1950, Qut}b joined al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimi >n.14 As a consequence 
of his activism, the Egyptian government sent him to prison in 1954. 
While in prison, Qut}b produced his two important works, exegesis of 
the Qur’a>n called Fī Z {ilāl al-Qur’a>n (in the Shade of the Qur’a>n) and 
Ma‘ālim all-T {arīq (Milestone); all of which have become bestseller in 
jihadist circles and provided much of the ideological and theological 
foundations for modern jihad.15 Qut}b introduced the concept of 
ignorance (jahiliya) and jihad in his Islamic interpretation. Jahiliya, 
according to Qut}b, refers to all man-made practices and ideologies, 
therefore they are against Islam. Like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, he called for the purification of tauhīd by calling back to the 
Qur’a>n and Sunnah in order to pull out Muslim from ignorance. In 
politics, he identified all political systems which were not based on the 
Qur’a>n and Sunnah as false religion and encouraged Muslims to live 
under shariah. He supported the idea of fighting against the 
unbelievers and equally against Muslims whom Qut}b accused of 
refusing to recognise the absolute lordship of God. He called Muslims 
to commit jiha>d which he thought as an everlasting religious obligation 
for Muslims in responding to endless adversary of Jews, Christians and 
unbelievers. Unlike al-Banna>, Qut }b accused Egyptian ‘ulamā, in 
particular those of al-Azhar University, of selling out Islam by 
legitimizing their rulers. Thus the most dangerous bid‘ah (heresy), they 
spread throughout the Muslim world was, for Qut}b, the notion that 
Islam was not a revolutionary religion. Furthermore, he insisted that 
struggle against the political domination of the tyranny (ţa>ghu>t) is 
obligatory.16 
                                                 
13 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Qur’anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The 
View of Sayyid Qut}b,”  The Middle East Journal 17,1 (1983), p. 18. 
14 Ahmad S. Moussali, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: the Ideological and Political Discourse of 
Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), pp. 24-25. 
15 After the publication of the Milestone, Nasser accused Qutb of having plan to revolt 
against the state and Muslim leaders. As a consequence, Qutb was prosecuted to death 
in 1966. See Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 52.  
16 Yvonne Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in John L. 
Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), pp. 85-86.  
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In politics, Qut}b was inspired by an Indian political activist, Sayyid 
Abu > A’la> al-Mawdu>di > (1903-1979). Al-Mawdu>di > believed that the 
primary duty for every Muslim is to revive Islamic politics and to resist 
the occupying foreigners. The vision was translated into the belief that 
God alone is sovereignty as a consequence of the purity of tauh}īd. This 
sovereignty expands to all human activities, including politics. 
Therefore, the truthful state, according to him, must take the form of a 
global Islamic government or khila>fah. This government runs “theo-
democracy” through which the whole representatives of Muslims 
communities (majlis shu>rā) were assigned to interpret the laws of God 
and to elect the ’amīr (the leader). For this ideal to realise, al-Mawdu >di > 
believed, jiha>d is the only means.  
However, it is worthwhile to note, as Fawas A. Greges points out, 
that all jihadist movements, before the 1990s, intended to strike 
ultimately against the rulers of their own homelands. Both al-Banna > 
and Qut}b struggled against nationalist-secular Egyptian rulers, whereas 
al-Mawdu>di > called for jiha>d against Indian Hindu-rulers. They 
embattled against their own rulers within national framework in order 
to create an Islamic state, which encompasses earthly political power. 
Prior to the mid-1990s, jihadist movements’ enemies are their own 
nationalists and secular rulers to which Greges attributes as “the near 
enemy” (al-‘aduww al-qarīb).17 However, since the collapse of Soviet 
Union and the end of Afghan war, there has been a new shift of focus 
away from localism and toward globalism against the “far enemy” (al-
‘aduww al-ba‘īd).18 The Afghan war (1979-1989) was an important event 
and locus for all jihadits groups, which contained of thousands of 
                                                 
17 Greges, The Far Enemy, pp. 13-14 
18 Greges urged that the shift related to two events: 1) the 1991 Gulf War and the 
permanent stationing of Americans forces in Saudi Arabia, 2) the defeat of religious 
nationalist on their home turf by the end of the 1990s. Greges, The Far Enemy, p. 30. 
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militants from different nationalities,19 to exercise their military 
capabilities and to establish secure bases for their military trainings.20  
The rising global jiha>d started when, in February 1989, the Soviet 
Union withdrew their military equipments and troops from 
Afghanistan and large quantities of its military hardware were donated 
to the newly independent Afghanistan. The end of war against atheist-
enemy brought problems within the Afghan war fighters as they 
debated what had to be done then after their victory in the battle, who 
should rule Afghanistan and whether the battle would still be 
continued against other enemies, the West or their homeland rulers. 
The debate brought further disunity among the Afghan War militias 
and created various splinter-groups that are divided into three 
groups.21 First group is ‘diaporic revolutionary militias’ who decided to 
continue the battle in other Muslim land battlefields, such as in 
Palestine. They perceived that the coming duty after freeing 
Afghanistan is to set Palestine freedom. Second is ‘retired militias’ who 
decided to stop the battle and prefer to live in their own country and 
avoided military and political activities. This groups initially was 
influenced by Saudi-wahhabi factions that during the first Gulf War 
(1991), in favour of the United States and refrained from being military 
activated after the end of the Afghan war.22 Contradicted to the two 
                                                 
19 According to Rasyid, between 1982 and 1992, around 35,000 Muslim radicals from 
43 countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East 
would pass through baptism under fire with the Afghan mujahidin and more than 
100.000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
See, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: the Story of the Afghan Warlords (Basingstoke and Oxford: 
Pan Books, 2001), p. 130. 
20 Kouser J. Azam, “Political Islam and Terrorism in Contemporary Times” in Adluri 
Subramanyam Raju (ed.), Terrorism in South Asia: Views from India (New Delhi: India 
Research Press, 2003), pp. 84-85 quoted from Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of 
Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists (Wesport etc.: Preager 
Security International, 2007), p. 15-16 
21 Greges argues that the jihadists, after the end of Afghan War, split into two; first 
militias were in favour of transnational jihadits through internationalising jihad and 
exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide, and second, religious nationalist militias 
whose main objective to make sure that Islamic revolution succeeded at home. Greges, 
The Far Enemy, p. 25. 
22 For further explanation on this faction read Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar jihad: Islam, 
Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University, Southeast Asia Program, 2006).  
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aforementioned groups, the former fighters of Afghan war continued 
their jiha >d and waged war against “far enemy” or ‘transnational 
jihadist’. These later jihadist faction perceived westerners as their next 
enemies and called for committing global jihad against the West and 
perceived the Saudi government as heretic and the henchman of the 
enemy of Islam. 
It is a Jordanian-Palestinian activist, `Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), 
who firstly set the ideological base for the coming global jihad. He 
called for battle against Christian encroachment on former Muslim 
lands by transcending national identities and backgrounds. He rejected 
internal Muslim infighting as trial (fitna) and supported conflicts on 
Philippines, Palestine and even Spain. In the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, Azzam issued a fatwā, supported by 
Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti, ‘Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, rulling that both the 
Afghan and the Palestinian struggles were jihad and killing infidels 
(kuffa>r) was a religious duty for all Muslims, otherwise they would fall 
into a great sin.23  
Another leading figure in the global jihad is the leader of jihad 
group of Egypt, Ayman al-Zawa>hiri > who arrived in the Afghan 
battlefield in the 1980s. Through his memoir released after 11 
September attacks, he superimposed that the awaited jiha>d is coming. 
The present jiha>d, he stated, is against the superpower states that have 
dominated the globe, the United States and its allies. He claimed that 
Afghanistan was no more than a military training ground for the 
“awaited battle” and invited all trained militias to wage jiha>d against the 
United States.24 Furthermore, exceeding Azzam, al-Zawa>hiri > accused 
the Saudi government of being the henchman of the real enemy of 
Islam because it allowed the United States to establish the permanent 
stationing of Americans forces in Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Gulf 
War.  
Osama bin Laden is the main financial donor of the global jiha >d of 
al-Zawa>hiri >. In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 
United States’ Operation Desert Strom, on 8 August 1996, he 
proclaimed a declaration of “War against the Americans Occupying the 
Land of the Two Holy lands (Expel the Infidels from the Arab 
                                                 
23 ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, al-Difa’ an ‘Ard al-Muslimin, p. 29; Marc Sageman, Understanding 
Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 18. 
24 Ayman Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, 3 December 2001. 
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Peninsula) stating that people should join forces and support each 
other to get rid of the main unbelievers (kufr) who have been 
controlling the Muslim world. For bin Laden, there was not more 
important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the Two 
Holy lands. Referring to Ibn Taimiyya, he said “to fight in defence of 
religion and belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after belief 
that fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion.” 
Again on 23 February 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwā, under the banner 
of “World Islamic Front for Jiha >d against the Jews and Crusaders,” 
asserting that it is religious duty for all Muslims to wage war against the 
United States’ citizens, both military and civilians, anywhere in the 
world.25 Along with these promoted hatred, from 2000 to 2003, 100 of 
more than 300 suicide attacks were undertook by bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
and killed thousands people in 17 countries. 
The Indonesian Jihadist Movement 
Though majority of scholars agreed that the coming and spread of 
Islam Indonesian is in peaceful manners, unlike that of Persian and 
India which was mainly by military invasion and political forces,26 
according to Ricklefs, the facts sometimes showed the otherwise. The 
fact is that in the sixteenth century Sumatra, Java and the seventeenth 
Sulawesi, Islamisation is often followed by conquest and Islam was 
spread out not only by persuasion and commercial pressure, but also 
by the sword under the banner of jiha>d.27 The early nineteenth-century 
West Sumatra witnessed the emergence of the Muslim militants group, 
Padri, whose vision is to elevate Islamic laws to a position of pre-
eminence. Under the influence of a likely Wahabi movement in Saudi 
                                                 
25 World Islamic Front Statement, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm, issued 23 February 1998; Scott 
Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” in The Washington Quarterly, 27:3: pp. 68-70. 
26 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed; Religious Development in Marocco and Indonesia (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968); Taufik Abdullah, Islam dan Masyrakat (Jakarta, 
LP3ES, 1987); Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 652. 
27 MC. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200 (Third Edition) (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 17. 
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Arabia, the movement was involved in warfare against the traditional 
custom (adat) of Minangkabau which was denounced as jahili.28 
In 1830, the nineteenth century Java also observed landlord revolt 
of Diponegoro, a rebellion popularly known as the “Java war.” The 
war was provoked by the refusal of the royal family of the Yogyakarta 
sultanate to nominate Diponegoro succeeding his father on the basis 
of the non-royal origins of his mother, to which the Dutch installed 
their fear of his Islamic orientation. In 1825, some of his property, 
including land on which his palace stood, were confiscated and 
Diponegoro reacted by waging jiha>d against both the Yogyakarta 
Sultanate and the Dutch.29 The battle in the name of jiha>d also had an 
effect on the Acehnese war against Dutch. The war began in 1873 and, 
in 1881, the Acehnese ‘ulamā declared the war as jiha>d fi > sabi >l Alla>h (war 
in path of God). In addition, a series of peasants’ revolts also occurred 
along the archipelago, initially in Java and Sumatera islands, under the 
banner of jiha>d. The spirit of jiha>d, highlighted by hatred toward 
Dutch-collonial that was identified as the infidels, remained the canopy 
of those struggles.  
As the rise of nationalism in the Muslim world in the early 
twentieth-century, the Indonesian jihadist episodes revealed a major 
shift. Unlike that of prior to the twentieth-century, establishing an 
independent nation-state was the popular vision of multitude 
Indonesian jihadist movements. Unlike that of the Padri, Diponegoro 
and Acehnese which nuanced in a limited area and locally oriented -if 
not to mention based on personal/individual interests, the twentieth-
century Indonesian jihadist movements had vision to establish an 
independence national-state as the Nahdlatul Ulama’s case that issued 
                                                 
28 Though the movement was defeated in 1837”, thanks to Dutch military invasion, 
Padri movement successfully caused an increasing penetration of Islam into 
Minangkabau society as reflected through the Minangkabau’s principles of “agamo 
mangato, adat mamakai” (religion rules, while adat practices), a new regulation that 
categorically condemned jahili adat as forbidden. Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and 
Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950, translated by Jan Steenbrink and Hanry 
Jansen (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi B.V., 1993), p. 75, Taufik Abdullah, “Adat 
dan Islam: Tinjauan Konflik di Minangkabau,” in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), Sejarah dan 
Masyarakat: Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia, 2nd edition (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, 1987), p. 119.  
29 Karel Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19 (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1984), p. 19 and 32. 
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a fatwa “jiha>d against the Dutch.”30 A number of paramilitary bodies 
were founded in responding to the Dutch and put their efforts for 
creating an independent state, despite the fact that some others were 
involved in politics. The struggle for a state-regulated country within 
national frameworks coloured their struggles and still continued in the 
era of Japanese rules (1942-1945).  
The year after the Indonesian independence was the next episode 
for jiha>d in Indonesia as it was the political test for Islamic groups to 
recognise a newly established ‘Indonesia secular-state.’ It had generated 
a long tough tension and conflict between proponents of Islamic state 
and nationalists. The tension culminated when the government 
abrogated –latter known as- “Seven Words formulation,” stating 
“Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim citizens to 
carry out the Islamic law/Syari’ah (Ketuhanan yang maha Esa dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya)” from the 
Indonesian constitution.31 The first political rebellion against the state 
was Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII), headed by 
Kartosurwiryo.32 He was military leader and a product of the Dutch 
                                                 
30 Amiq, Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia : Study of the Fatwas of Sayyid 
’Uthman (1822-1913) and K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari (1871-1947) (Unpublished MA thesis at 
Leiden University, 1998); Yudian Wahyudi, Slogan “Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan Sunnah”. 
31 On 22 June 1945, nine leading Indonesian leaders –known as “Nine Coordinator” 
(Panitia Sembilan)- collaborating on Committee for the preparation of Indonesian 
Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI) successfully had 
drafted a constitution for new established republic. The draft is the second version of 
Pancasila -known as Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta)- and a reaction toward the 
preceding version of Pancasila as well to which the future Indonesian president, 
Sukarno, promulgated through his speech known as “The Birth of the Pancasila” on 1 
June 1945. Due to the objection from some political leaders, mainly those are from 
Eastern part of Indonesia which are majority Christians, delivered to the next 
Indonesian vice president, Muhammad Hatta, Committee for the preparation of 
Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI), on 18 
august 1945, changed the formulation of the first sentence of Pancasila by removing 
the words “with the obligation of its Muslims citizens to carry out the Shariah,” so that 
the first sila sounds “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”. Read, Karl D. Jackson, Traditional 
Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behaviour (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1980), p. 9 and Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, Islam dan Politik; Teori Belah 
Bambu, Masa Depan Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), 
p. 29. 
32 Cees van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Faisal Ismail, Pijar-Pijar Islam; Pergumulan Kultur dan 
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high school system.33 His Islamic vision was maintained when he had 
been a private secretary of Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, president 
of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/PSII (Indonesian Islamic Sarekat 
Party). In contrast to another of Tjokroaminoto’s pupil, Sukarno, one 
of founding fathers of Indonesia, Kartosuwiryo grew to prefer Islam, 
instead of nationalism. In 1936, he started to promote the idea of 
establishing an Islamic state and founded a spiritual training centre, the 
Suffa Institute, which was transformed as a military training camp in 
1942.34 On 7 August 1949, he proclaimed his Indonesian Islamic State, 
let alone the unrecognised 14 August 1945 declaration of Indonesian 
Islamic State. Unlike Sukarno who saw communists as the backbone 
for popular supports for the regime, Kartosuwiryo maintained 
communism as an atheist threat to the very existence of Islam.35 
Kartosuwiryo demanded President Sukarno abandon both Nationalist 
and Communist and insisted the president to return to Islam and to 
make the Qur’a>n and Sunnah as the state constitution. His jiha >d was a 
response to Sukarno’s ideological amalgamation between Nationalism, 
Religion and Communism (Nasionalis, Agama dan 
Komunis/NASAKOM) and started to fight against the government. 
Through a vigorous anti-guerrilla campaign in the period 1960-1962, 
Sukarno eventually defeated Kartosuwiryo’ Darul Islam.  
Another military leader of Darul Islam is Abdul Qahhar 
Mudzakkar. As with Kartosuwiryo, Mudzakkar was a military leader 
who was involved in the struggle for Indonesian independence against 
the Dutch in Java (1945-1950). Despite his accomplishment, he was 
passed over for the leadership by then president Soekarno and sent to 
South Sulawesi, a peripheral locale compared to Java. With the support 
of his loyal followers, Qahhar established his own command and 
proclaimed a guerrilla war against the newly-established republic in 
1950 and joined Kartosuwiryo’s Darul Islam. On 7 August 1953, he 
                                                                                                      
Struktur (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama Departemen Agama RI, 2002), p. 
49. 
33 Bernard Johan Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1982), p. 55; Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964), 
pp. 27-28. 
34 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 
1958), p. 168; Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 55. 
35 Wahyudi, Slogan “Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan Sunnah”. 
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formally announced the integration of Sulawesi into Darul Islam and 
was subsequently named National Deputy Minister of Defence on 
Darul Islam. In 1957 when communication among Darul Islam 
members in regions continued to break down, Qahhar declared the 
outright independence of Sulawesi and, on 14 May 1963, proclaimed 
Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia/RPII (the Islamic Federated 
Republic of Indonesia) with its capital in South Sulawesi.36 On 15 
December 1963, with the slogan “Selamatkan Sulawesi!” (Save 
Sulawesi!), he decided to sever all political links with Javanese 
Indonesia as the only means of saving Sulawesi from Javanese 
domination or “Majapahitism.”37 The However, the government 
successfully put the armed guerrilla of Qahhar and his militias to an 
end as, on 3 February 1965, Qahhar was killed in Lasolo.38 
The further historical stage of Indonesian jihadist is when Soeharto 
assumed the political power of the state replacing Sukarno’ Old Order. 
Tantamount to that of the Old Order, the Islamic rebellions under the 
banner of jiha>d had still continued during the New Order. They waged 
jiha>d against the heretic state that implemented the state ideology of 
Pancasila. The first rebellion was Komando Jihad which, according to 
the official explanation of the Indonesian government, had a mission 
to create Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia (the Council for Indonesian 
Islamic Revolution). Two detained leaders of the movement, Ismail 
Pranoto (Hispran) and Danu Mohammad Hasan, were the former 
leaders of Kartosuwiryo’ Darul Islam movement. In 1971, both leaders 
were approved for amnesty and hired by Badan Koordinasi 
Intelejen/BAKIN (the Indonesian Intelligence Agency) of Kodam 
Siliwangi, to join struggle against the coming threat of communists’ 
activities. In spite of being subjugated by the government, since 1977, 
Komando Jihad had been in reverse striking against the government 
and successfully attracted numerous former Darul Islam activists to 
join in the struggle. In Surakarta, Central Java, Komando Jihad, was 
                                                 
36 Tihami, Darul Islam di Masserengpulu: Studi Tentang Perubahan Sosial dan Keagamaan di 
Malua, Enrekang, Sulawesi Selatan (Makassar: Pusat Latihan dan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu 
Sosial, Hassanuddin University, 1984), p. 58. 
37 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran 
Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999 [1960]). 
38 Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak 
(Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004), p. 339. 
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headed by Warman who killed the Rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret 
(the Eleventh March University) in January 1979. According to the 
official Indonesian court document, the assassination was committed 
because the victim was accused of being responsible for sending 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to detention and tried to 
notify the government about the existence of Jamaah Islamiyyah, 
another wing of Darul Islam activists operating in Central Java. 
Another Komando Jihad operation was a robbery managed by 
Warman and Abdullah Umar.39 The robbery was based on the fa’I 
concept or confiscating property of enemies of Islam for the purpose 
of struggle. On 1 March 1979, Warman’s team successfully robbed a 
car transporting salary for officers of Institute Agama Islam Sunan 
Kalijaga/IAIN Sunan Kalijaga (the State Islamic Institute of Sunan 
Kalijaga). In the late 1980s, the Indonesian Police successfully 
devastated Komando Jihad and Warman was killed in Soreang, West 
Java, on 23 July 1981.40 
As with Komando Jihad, Jamaah Imran, founded in 1980 in 
Cimahi, West Java, was another jihadist movement against the 
Pancasila state. The Jamaah was headed by Imran bin Muhammad 
Zein who proclaimed jiha >d against the heretic ruler of the New Order. 
The Jamaah activities were ended when, in August 1980, the 
Indonesian police attacked the Jamaah’s base activities, Istiqamah 
mosque. Forty four members of the Jamaah were arrested, whereas the 
leader, together with some of his followers, successfully escaped from 
the attack. In 11 March 1981, Imran and his followers fought back as 
they attacked the Cicendo police office in Bandung. Two weeks later, 
five of his follower hijacked the Garuda Indonesian Airplane and 
forced the pilot to land the plane in Don Muang Airport, Bangkok. 
The drama of hijacking was ended when Komando Pasukan Khusus 
(the Special Forces Command) killed four of five hijackers and on 7 
April 1981, Imran was arrested in Jakarta. In the late of the 1981s, 
Imran was pronounced to death by the Jakarta Regency Court and 
executed in May 1983. 
                                                 
39 Born in Lamahala, Flores in 1949, Abdullah Umar was a teacher at Pesantren al-
Mukmin, Ngruki, Solo. In the 1980, Umar was sentenced to death due to his 
involvement in the Warman movement and executed in 1989. Read: ICG, Asia Briefing, 
p. i. 
40 Taufik Adnan Kamal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariat Islam; Dari Indonesia 
Hingga Nigeria (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), pp. 68-69. 
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Another Indonesian jihadist rebellion movement is Jamaah 
Mujahidin which was founded in May 1989. Anwar Warsidi led the 
movement in Talangsari, Central Lampung. The movement declared 
the war against the apostate Indonesian state rulers by waging jiha>d fi > 
sabi >l Alla>h against the government. In the 1980s, Indonesian Military 
Army attacked the region and killed five hundred the movement’ 
followers. Again, on 7 February 1989, Komando Resort Militer 
043/Garuda Hitam, led by A.M. Hendro Priyono, attacked the base of 
Jamaah in Talang Sari, and killed 246 people.41 
Though the New Order government aggressively attacked those 
Islamic rebellion movements, initially the regime failed to completely 
prevent their latent political activities as, due to the state aggressive 
repression, Islamic militants built their clandestine networks which 
fostered further jiha>d episode in Indonesia. In addition, these militant 
activists secretly transferred and distributed ideas of Middle Eastern 
jihadist ideologies, such as of Qut}b, al-Mawdu >di >, al-Banna>, through 
sermons, h}alaqah (religious study club alike) and mabit (literally means 
staying or extensive study on Islam) and publications. The core targets 
of those activities are university students, especially in Yogyakarta and 
Bandung, which eventually created militant-Muslim networks.42  
In addition, the aggressive attitudes of the New Order government 
had also generated the leaders of militant movements to leave the 
country. However, communication and interaction among leaders kept 
maintained, initially through da’wah activism. When the Afghan War 
broke up, they sent hundreds militant cadres from Malaysia and 
Indonesia to participate in the battlefield against Russian armies and to 
have military trainings. The Afghan War had created fundamental 
momentum for the next development of jihadist movements in 
Indonesian. Not only did the Afghan War provide Indonesian jihadist 
the future expansion of ideologies, networks, linking Indonesia-
Afghanistan-Middle East, and financial supports, but also it served as 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 277. 
42 See, Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai PKS: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah 
di Indonesia (Bandung: Teraju, 2003); Din Syamsuddin, Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru 
(Jakarta: Logos, 2000). 
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an opportunity to exercise their capabilities in weaponry and war 
strategies.43 
The Emergence of Jamaah Islamiyyah 
The Afghan war was seen as a useful training ground for a future 
jiha>d in Indonesia and other Muslim countries as Indonesians started 
to witness a major shift among Indonesian jihadits after the war 
ended.44 Hundreds Indonesians were sent to Afghanistan to be military 
trained in Peshawar and to join coalition with other jihadists from 
Muslim countries in the battlefield against the atheist-Russian armies.45 
In addition, as with other global jihad groups, the Afghan war had also 
transformed the ideological orientation of Indonesian jihadists from 
national-oriented movement to the global war against al-‘aduww al-ba‘īd 
(the far enemy) as Jamaah Islamiyyah demonstrated. 
Jamaah Islamiyyah grew out of the effort of two radical Muslim 
clerics, Abdullah Sungkar (d. 1999) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Jamaah 
Islamiyyah is believed as the descendant of earlier Muslim rebellion 
movement, Darul Islam, and of more recent transnational Islamic 
networks, particularly individuals who gained practical jiha>d 
experiences in Afghanistan and fostered close ties with al Qaeda.46 The 
establishment of Jamaah Islamiyyah however would take us to the 
1970s Indonesian politics when the New Order’ efforts tried to pacify 
left-wings nationalists and Islamic groups and to campaign Pancasila as 
the sole ideology of the state (asas tunggal Pancasila).47 Both Ba’asyir and 
Sungkar campaigned against the government’s policy and accused the 
                                                 
43 David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: Berkeley University Press, 2002), p. 18. 
44 ICG, “Ngruki Network,”; Greges, The Far Enemy, p. 3; Blontank Poer, “Tracking the 
Roots of Jamaah Islamiyah,” The Jakarta Post, 8 March 2003. 
45 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Jakarta: 
Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005). 
46 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto 
Indonesia” (July 2002); Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, et al., Aptitude for Destruction: 
Volume 2 (Case Studies of Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups) (Pittsburgh: 
RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 60. 
47 For further reading on the New Order government policies on Pancasila and 
Muslim responses reads Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru 
(Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996); Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003). 
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state of intimidating Muslims’ leaders and disseminating false religion. 
They consider recognizing Pancasila is tantamount to violating Islamic 
norms. To do so, in 1972, they established a salafi pesantren of Al-
Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java (well-known as Ngruki 
pesantren) and built clandestine networks of radicals through Jamaah 
Islamiyyah.48 They prohibited their Ngruki’ santris (students) to hold 
any flag-ceremonies (upacara bendera) or salute the Indonesian flag 
which was considered as a part of bid‘a (innovation). In the late 1970s, 
Ba'asyir circulated Risalah Jihad dan Hijrah (The Path of Jiha>d and Hijrah) 
which was written by his father-in-law, Abdul Qadir Baraja. The 
Risalah contains the explanation of the legal status of jiha >d in Islam 
and the obligation for Muslims to wage war on those who are against 
the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. And in October 1976, 
Sungkar delivered a speech at the central mosque of Surakarta by 
which he publicly campaigned against participating in the 1977 election 
and called for Golongan Putih/Golput (not to vote in the election). On 
20 January 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, on the occasion of one of their 
sermons, publicly acknowledged and invited audiences to implement 
all aspects of the Sharia and to replace both Pancasila and the 1945 
Indonesia Constitution with the Qur’a >n and the Sunnah.49 As 
consequences of their activism, the Indonesian Police Department 
seized Sungkar on 10 November 1978 and Ba’asyir eleven days later on 
three counts: their involvement in the Indonesia Islamic State 
movement, their campaigns against the Pancasila and for Golput. 
In April 1982, the Regional Court (Pengadilan Negeri) of Surakarta 
sentenced both Sungkar and Ba’asyir to nine years of detention. Both 
appealed to the Provincial Court (Pengadilan Tinggi) that then sentenced 
to three years and ten months detention, equivalent to their pre-trial 
detention, and were released on 9 September 1982. The Provincial 
Court’s decision left Sungkar and Ba’ayir dissatisfied and they brought 
another appeal to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung/MA), 
concerning the Provincial Court’s decision. On 2 March 1985, when 
                                                 
48 Syaifudin Zuhri, “Transnalitionalising Jamaah Islamiyyah,” Al-Jami‘ah, Vol. 48, No. 1 
(2010): pp. 55-56; ICG, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki 
Network” in Indonesia (Corrected on 10 January 2003),” 8 August 2002. 
49 Court’s exceptions with the title “Idiologi Negara Pancasila, Gerakan Komunisme 
dan Ajaran Islam” (Ideology of Pancasila State, Communist Movement and Islam), of 
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the Supreme Court was about to announce its decision, Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir did not show up in the court and made hijrah (fleeing)50 to 
Malaysia. According to Ba’asyir, his hijrah was necessary because the 
government illegitimately forced Indonesians to accept the Pancasila as 
the sole ideology. As he could not accept the government’s 
programme and initially could not challenge it, Ba’asyir claimed that he 
had no choice but to make hijrah.51 
During their two years of freedom in Central Java prior to fleeing 
to Malaysia in 1985, Sungkar and Ba’asyir successfully extended 
Jamaah Islamiyyah’s network through usrah activists of the Sudirman 
Mosque (Masjid Sudirman) in Yogyakarta. The Masjid Sudirman, often 
known as Masjid Colombo, is well-known for its Islamic preachers 
(muballigh) who were as devoted to opposing the Suharto regime as 
they were to the strict implementation of Sharia law. Among the 
leading  muballighs associated with the Sudirman mosque were Irfan S. 
Awwas, M. Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin Muqti alias Abu Jibril 
Abdurahman who later joined Sungkar’s and Ba’asyir’s hijrah in 
Malaysia and became the instructor of the Abu Sayyaf camp in 
Afghanistan and Muchliansyah, a Ngruki teacher.52 
Once in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir arranged for Darul Islam 
cadres from Indonesia to have military exercises and trainings in the 
Jiha >d Fighters Academy of Afghanistan (Harbiy Pohatun Mujahidin-e-
Afghanistan Ittihad-e-Islamiy) camp, headed by the head of Tanzim 
Ittihad-e-Islamiy Afghanistan, Abdul Robbir Rasul Sayyaf.53 The 
                                                 
50 Hijrah means “to cut someone off from friendly association” or “to avoid 
association with”. Historically, it is a political concept by which Prophet Muhammad 
conducted in order to avoid the struggle with the people in Mecca and made his hijrah 
to Medina where he established an Islamic community which eventually was used to 
attack his homeland. Therefore, hijrah is not only a withdrawing action from the 
surroundings, but also as a strategy to fight back. See, W. Montgomery Watt, “Hidjra,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, volume III (Brill, 2008), p. 366, column 1. 
51 Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Yogyakarta: Wihdah 
Press, 2003), pp. 37-38; “Hilangnya Sungkar dan Ba'asyir” (the Disappearance of 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir), Tempo Magazine, 16 March 1985, p. 24; “Ragam Kisah Ba’asyir 
dan Jaringan Ngruki” (Various Stories About Ba’asyir and his Ngruki Network), Tempo 
Magazine, Issue 36/XXXI/04-10 November 2002; and Singh, The Talibanization of 
Southeast Asia, p. 63. 
52 International Crisis Group, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, p. 9. 
53 Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, pp. 47-48. 
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training was aimed at militarily strengthening Darul Islam and to wage 
jiha>d in Indonesia as they went home. Ajengan Masduki, another Darul 
Islam leader, was assigned to supply Indonesian cadres for the 
training.54  
The first-half of the 1990s, jiha>d fighters in Afghanistan however 
witnessed a major shift by the rise of a new jiha>d organisation, Taliban, 
supported by the native Afghans.55 This body harshly attacked other 
factions of jiha>d fighters, including the Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islamiy to 
which Jamaah Islamiyyah took it as shelter in Afghanistan. Avoiding 
the clash, Jamaah Islamiyah cadres managed to leave Afghanistan and, 
perhaps either because of the harsh political environment in Indonesia 
or the desire to be closer to their teachers (Sungkar and Ba’asyir), they 
opted to stay in Malaysia.56 In 1991, Sungkar and one of these veterans, 
Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, later well-known as one of the 
masterminds of the Bali bombing, decided to establish Pesantren 
Lukmanul Hakim in Johore, Malaysia.57 Around the same year, begun 
with the sermons and routine religious meetings, Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
established a jiha>d fighters network through the Association of Jihad 
Fighters of Malaysia (Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia/KMM) that was 
involved in many bombings attacks in the Philippines and the 
assassination of Malaysian parliamentarian Joe Fernandes in 2000. 
Through these two institutions, Sungkar and Ba’asyir attracted 
Malaysians to join Jamaah Islamiyyah activism. With a loose alliance 
with other jihadist movements in Southeast Asia, like MILF (Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front), Abu Sayyaf and Rabithat al-Mujahidin (the 
Mujahidin Coalition),58 Jamaah Islamiyyah had become the hub for 
                                                 
54 Ajengan Masduki was born in Ciamis. In 1946, he fought in the Hizbullah unit 
against the Dutch and attended the 1946 Cisayeung, West Java meeting in which it laid 
the groundwork for the establishment of Darul Islam three years later. Masduki was 
arrested in 1982 because of his involvement in Komando Jihad and released in 1984. 
See ICG, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy 
Bombing,” 23 February 2003, pp. 20-21.  
55 Edwards, Before Taliban. 
56 Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiya, p. 78. 
57 Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah” in Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, June 2000: pp. 171-175. 
58 Rabitatul Mujahidin, or Mujahidin Council, is a loose alliance of guerrilla and jihad 
fighters groups in Southeast Asia under the leadership of Hambali. Read Jones, “The 
Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” p. 171; Kumar Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing 
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Southeast Asia jihadists and the supporter of jihadists movements and 
terrorist attacks.59  
In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyyah had also a direct link to jihadist 
groups that actively engaged in sectarian conflicts. During the 
Moluccas Muslim-Christian conflicts, Jamaah Islamiyyah had provided 
secure training facilities, increased logistical support, and opportunities 
to undertake joint operations for many jihadits groups, such as Laskar 
Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah. In addition, Jamaah Islamiyyah had 
also built a strong connection with al Qaeda.  The link between the 
two can be traced back when Abdullah Sungkar travelled to 
Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden in 1993–1994.60 Although not 
a creation of al Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyyah was inspired ideologically by 
al-Qaeda.  In return, al Qaeda gained the advantage of Jamaah 
Islamiyyah’s covert infrastructure to support its attacks. In January 
2000, some Jamaah Islamiyyah members, including Hambali, had a 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur with several high-level al Qaeda operatives, 
including two 9/11 hijackers and others who were involved in 
planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.61 In addition, al 
Qaeda’s plans bomb attacks on U.S. and western interests in Singapore 
in late 2001, which were eventually blocked, depended heavily on 
Jamaah Islamiyyah’s clandestine infrastructure and local knowledge for 
surveillance of the targets and for building the truck bombs.62 
As an organisation, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists a structured 
leadership with the ’amīr (leader) at the top level of body and the majlis 
shu>ra> served as consultative council. Sungkar set as the first ’amīr and 
then was replaced by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after the former died in 1999. 
In the operational levels, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists four territorial 
groups (mantiqi) with responsibilities for Jamaah Islamiyyah’s 
                                                                                                      
Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia” in Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27, no. 3 
(2005), p. 321; Gunaratna, “Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism,” p. 20. 
59 Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and 
Terrorists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
60 Rohan K. Gunaratna, Political and Security Outlook 2003: Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
What to Expect (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003), p. 174. 
61 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 123: Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of 
Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 195-6. 
62 Jackson and Baker et al., Aptitude for Destruction, p. 65. 
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operations throughout Southeast Asia; mantiqi 1 is centred in Malaysia 
with a branch in Singapore; mantiqi 2 covers most of Indonesia and 
probably becomes the source of many Jamaah Islamiyyah’ operatives, 
mantiqi 3 has been important for training Jamaah Islamiyyah personnel 
and supporting its logistical networks and mantiqi 4 centred in 
Australia, focusing primarily on recruiting and fundraising.63 
While mantiqi are based on wide-geographical commands, the 
lowest level of Jamaah Islamiyyah’s structure, fi>’ah (cell), is the ground-
level which serves more operational autonomy to take action. It 
appears that the fi>’ah has been significantly growing as the leaders were 
under pressure and arrested by authorities during 1999-2004. In 2003, 
for instance, mantiqi 2 expanded into the district level (kabupaten) in 
their operation. In Central Java, it produced fi>’ah for 6 regions (Pati, 
Semarang 1, Semarang 2, Kedu, Pekalongan and Banyumas) and 
successfully recruited 141 members.64 The growth of fi>’ah is in tandem 
with the flourishing of Jamaah Islamiyyah’s military cell-groups. 
Zulkarnaen, a former Afghan fighter as well as a Ngruki’s teacher, built 
the so-called Laskar Istimata65 and Noordin M. Top (killed in 2009) 
and Azahari (killed in 2005), established Thoifah Muqatilah;66 both are 
suicide-troops of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. In July 2009, Noordin M. 
Top transformed the troop into Tandzim al-Qaida and initiated the 
second Marriot and Ritz hotels suicide bombings. 
Apart from the increasing number of Jamaah Islamiyyah’s 
fighthers, it is also worthy to speak of the dynamic of its public 
appearances, particularly after the establishment of Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia/MMI (the Council of Indonesian Jiha >d Fighters) in 2000 by 
Ba’asyir. A number of his followers in Jamaah Islamiyyah from the 
very beginning contested his initiative to establish the Majelis. 
                                                 
63 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia; Jackson and Baker, et al., Aptitude for 
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However, his legacy was still influential among Jamaah Islamiyyah’ 
cadres although they considered him as having abandoned the basic 
tenet of Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah/PUPJI (the 
General Guide for the Struggle of Jamaah Islamiyyah) which defined 
the Jamaah as tanz}i >m al-sirr (secret organisation) and put its struggle to 
counter society, instead of the state.67 The establishment had caused a 
long of tough and tension between moderate and radical factions of 
Jamaah Islamiyyah. Until, suddenly, on 19 July 2008, Ba’asyir resigned 
from his position as the amīr of MMI and established his Jamaah 
Ansharut Tauhid/JAT (the Council of the Saviour in Muslim belief) on 
17 September 2008. It is argued that the resignation is not only caused 
by the limited control of Ba’asyir within the MMI leadership as the 
public appearances behind the resignation demonstrated, but also it 
confirms the turning point of the figure to the PUPJI principles in the 
struggle.68 
Conclusion 
To conclude, it is argued that the ideology of jihadist is that of 
Middle Eastern origin and its development demonstrates the 
continuity and change of radical ideology in the Muslim world. The 
twentieth century of jihadist movements exemplifies the contemporary 
development of jihadist ideology as they have been transformed from 
targeting “the near enemy” (al-‘aduww al-qarīb) to the “far enemy” (al-
‘aduww al-ba‘īd). In Indonesia, the New Order government’s repression 
had paved a way of mushrooming global jihadist movements whose 
ideas were transferred from its origin in the Middle East to Indonesia. 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir are two former Darul Islam leaders who had 
played important roles in transforming Darul Islam ideology from 
national-based to transnational movement, and indeed they 
successfully maintained networks between Indonesia, Afghanistan and 
the Middle East through Jamaah Islamiyyah that has become the 
backbone and architect for terrors and bombing attacks in Southeast 
Asia.[] 
                                                 
67 Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah (Majlis Qiyadah 
Markaziyah), 30 May 1996; Elena Pavlona, “From Counter-Society to a Counter-State 
Movement: Jemaah Islamiyyah According to PUPJI” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
30/2007 
68 Zuhri, “Transnalitionalising Jamaah Islamiyyah,” pp. 70-1. 
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